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JONATHAN C. HAMILTON.

1.

INTRODUCfTON

At the edge of Panama City, on the Pacific side of the Panama
Canal, the "Bridge of the Am.ericasu stands at the crossroads of the
Anwricas. It was in Panama three decades ago that Latin America
met

a

crossroads with respect to the resolution of international

disputes

th ro u gh arbitration -a11d concluded the 1975

Inter

American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration
("Panan1a Convention"). 1

This Essay discusses how the legal framework of international
commercial arbitration has evolved duri.ng the past three decades.

It considers the role of the Panama Convention i n principle and i n
practice, the efficacy of the Panama Convention in light o f the
ratification

of

the

1958 United Nahons Convention on the

Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New
York Convention"):! across Latin America, and arbitral precedents
in juTisdiclions across the region.

Jonathan C. Hamilton, Partner, White & Case LLP, Washington, D.C.; ChaiT,
Institute for Transnational Arbitration (ITA) Americas Initiative. The author
gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Michael Roche and Sabina Sacco in the
preparation of this Essay, which is authored on the occasion of the thirtieth
anniversary of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of lntenuztional Law. This
Essay is based in part on a speech by the author on ''50 Anos de Ia Convenci6n de
Nueva York: I mplicancias para America La tina," Seminario h<ternacional de Ia
Nueva Ley de Arbitraje, Lima, Peru (2008).
1
Organization of Ainerican States [OAS), Inter-American Convention on
International ComJTtercia1 Arbitration, pmbl., Jan. 30, 1975, 1438 U.N.T.S. 245
[hereinaiter Panama Convention].
2 United Nntions Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement o f Foreign
Arbitral Awcwds, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New
York Convention).
·
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HISTORfCAL CONTEXT

For the century prior to 1975, the p revailing perspective across
the region was reflected in the so-called " Calvo D octrine . " B earing
the name of an Argentine diplomat, the Calvo Doctrine hel d , in
short, that j urisdiction in international commercial d i s p u tes lies
within the country in w hich the i nvestment is located.

The Calvo

D octrine

arbitra tio n

generally

reflected

the

reluctance

toward

across Latin Ameri ca.
In this context, Latin Arnerican states were s l o w to ratify the
New Y o rk Convention. Only three s tates did so i n its first twenty
vears.
J

In the area of investment arbitration, Latin American s tates

were even slower to ratify the 1966 Convention on the Se ttl ement
of D isputes Between States and Nationals o f Other States ("ICSI D
Convention" ) .J Only two d i d s o i n its first twenty year s .4
Against this hi storical backdrop,5 the Organization of American
States

(" OAS" )

Conference

on

held
Private

its

First

Specialized

I nternational

Law

in

Inter-An1erican
the

Republic

of

Panama in 1975. At the concl usion of the Conference, " desirous of
concluding a convention on internati o nal commercial arbitration,"
the states of the OAS p romulgated the Panama Conventio n .

3

International

Centre

for

Settlement

of

Investment

Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes

Disputes

Between

[ICSID),

States

and

Nationals of Other States, March 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
4

Jonathan C. Hamilton, Compendium of Latin American Arbitration Law, TNT'L

DISPUTES Q. (Spring 2009). The first Latin American states to ratify the New York
Convention were Ecuador in 1962, Mexico in 1971 and Chile in 1975. The first
Latin American states to ratify the ICSID Convention were El Salvador in 1984
and Ecuador in 1986. Id.
s

The meaning and implications of the Calvo Doctrine are not without

nuance. See, e.g., Horacia Grigera Na6n, ICC Arbitration and Courts of Lmu: Practical
Experiences in Latin America, in LAW OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND DISPUTE

SETTLEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY: LIBER AMICORUM KARL BOCKSTIEGEL 231 (Robert
Briner, et al. eds., 2000)

(describing how the Calvo Doctrine impacts ICC

arbitration); Horacia Grigera Na6n, Factors to Consider in Choosing an Efficient
Arbitrator, in IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND AWARDS:
40 YEARS OF APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 286 (Albert Jan van den
Berg ed., 1999)

(explaining how the Calvo Doctrine can impact arbitrator

selection); Horacia Grigera Na6n, Latin Anzerican Arbitration Culture and the ICC
Arbitration System, in CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
OLD ISSUES & NEW TRENDS, 117 (S. Fromme! & B. Rider eds., 1999) (explaining
further the effects of the Calvo Doctrine); see also Horacia A Grigera-Naon, Latin
America: Overcoming Traditional Hostility Towards Arbitration, 477 INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 375 (1988); DONALD SHEA, THE
CALVO CLAUSE (1955).
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l'ha t enabled, to some exlent1 the evolutio na ry en1ergcnce of a
new era in Lat in American dispute resolution related to cross

border cornrnerce and investment. Tn a 1978 article in the A111ericall
{ournnl of lutcmational Law, one commen tato r SLllTlm<n·ized t he state
of affclirs

as

follows:

c�Ivo invented his defense mechanism in an era w hen

Latin America conceived itself to be lhreatened by the
intrw�ive power and jnstinct of North A merica.
Americas have ch. cm ged.

But the

In the interd ep enden t world of

the last quarter of the 20th cenhuy, the Calvo d oc tr i ne is no

longer either a necessary or a satisfactory prescription for
the resoluti011 of foreign investment d is putes
So t he
industrial
democracies and the i ns titutio n s of the
.

international economic system have tried

a

var.iety of

devices to persuade Latin A merica to give up its Calvo
induced isolation

. .

.

. While Latins have held fast to

Calvoism in the abstract, they have, in pr u cti c e, begun to
show some w i llingness to di]ute principle with a dash of
self-interest in cextain recent fore ign investment cases.6
The three decades since the

Pana n:.1.a

Convention have been

marked by c:�.n evolutionary expansion in the use of arbi h ation in
·

Latin America, par ticu larly begi nn ing in the 1990s.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMIVIERCIAL ARBITRATION
IN LATIN AMERfCA

3.

The lega l framework for international commercial arbitration
was largely reconstructed from the ground up over the past three
decades - treaty ratification by treaty ratification, law by Jaw,
juri s diction by jurisdiction.
The

Panama

acceptance

of

Convention

international

sig naled
comn1ercial

a

step

towards

arbitration

in

the
Latin

America.. Negolialed over a series of years, it was envisio ned as a
regional agreement modeled after the New York Convention,
although so

few

Latin American states had ratified that treaty.

A

prin"lary objective of the Panama Convention was to remedy
perceived deficienc ies in the internal arbitration laws of individual

r,

\tVilliam D. Rogers, Of Missi01111ries, Fanatics, and Lrrwyers: SOII/I?
72 AM. J. [NT'!. L.1,3- 6 (1978),

Jnuestme11l Disputes in the J\111ericas,
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Latin American sta tes by establishing the requirements for valid
mbitration agreements, the procedure for the recognition and
en£orcement of arbitral awards, and olher n1atters

related

to

arbitral procedure. The Panama Convention has now been ratified
by a tot<� I of seventeen countrjes, including sixteen Latin Arnerican
states and the United States.'
The New York Convention has been rabfled by nineteen Latin
An1erican states and a total of 144 countries worldwide.
ratification of

the

the

New

York

American sta tes has followed

Convention

pace with

Overall,

among

Latin

that of the Panama

Convention- by 1995, for example, fifteen Latin American states
ralificd

had

the

Pana1na

Convention

while

lhc

Nevv

York

Convention had been adopted by thirteen states in the region.

As

discussed below, Brazil notably adopted the New York Convention
only in 2002.
Principally

in

the

1990s,

many

Latin American countries

overhauled their don1estic arbitration laws to provide for the type
of commercial arbitration contemplated in the Panan1a and New
York Conventions.

The changes i n Latin American arbitration

laws occurred as part of sweeping legal reforms and economic
libera l1zation.

Many Latin American states based their do1nestic

arbitration laws in whole or in part on the Model

Law on

Commercial

Nations

Arbitration

forn1ulated

Commission on Interna tional

by

the

United

Trade Law ("UNCITRAL Model

Law").
Some countries have even revised their domestic arbitration
laws more than once. Peru/ for instance, enacted a new arbitration
law in 1 996, an.d another new law in 2008. Indeed, Peru's 1996l a w
was

already

UNCITRAL

a

largely

Model

modern

Law.

statute

Nonetheless,

based
Peru's

on

the

n1ost

1985
recent

arbitration statute entered into force on Septem.ber 1, 2008.

In

7 See
OAS Foreign Trade Information System, Dispute Settlement:
Commercial Arbitration, ·n1e Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial
Arbitration,
http:/ jwww.sice.oas.org/ dispute/comarb/ iacac
/iacac2e.asp (listing the signatories). With respect to the negotiating history of
the Panama Convention, see OAS, Proyecto Cmzvenci6n Interamen'cnna Sobre
Atbitmje Comercial llzternncion.nl [Draft ConveJ1tion on International Arbitration],

1\ctc!S y Documentos de Ia Conferencia £specializada Interamericnna Sabre Derecho

(Minutes and Documents of the Inter-American Specialized
Conference on PrivCite lnternacional Lawl, vol. 2, OAS Doc. Ser.K/ XXI.l j CTDTP64, Jan. 15, 1975.
lntemncional Privado
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Latin American Commercial Arbitration
Treaties and Laws
EXCERPT OF TP.E COMPENDIUM OF LATIN AMERICAN ARSITR.ATION LAW

����

.,.;f.�:U

N�Yoc!<
Convention
Emry into loo:.�

P;)nama
Convenrion
Entry lntc fo,ce

Arbtvation

1989

1995

1967/81

1995

1999

1997

2002

1995

1996

1975

1976

2004

1979

1987

1989/91/96/98

1988

1978

1997

2002

NO

2008

1962

1991

1997/2005/06

1998

1980

2002

1984

1986

1995

2001

1979

2000

1971

1978

1993

2003

NO

2005

1985

1976

1999/2006

::C PARAGUAY

1998

1977

2002

HPERU

1988

1989

2008

�URUGUAY

1983

1977

1988

-VENEZUELA

1995

1985

1998

;:::J ARGENTINA

:Ed BOLIVIA
f(Oa../I BRAZIL
9;;J CHILE
:--�--) COLOMBIA
t.il5<lZllii\ COSTA RICA
:::DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
�ECUADOR
� EL SALVADOR
�GUATEMALA
:::l HONDURAS
FIB MEXICO
......J NICARAGUA
�PANAMA
-

l.awJJ
Amonrtments
iN� adctlf.tl

,_

© 2000-09, Jonathan C. Hamiilon. This table may only be used with attnbution.

particular, the 2008 law builds upon the experience of Peru and
other nations in the held of arbitration, and also takes into accow:tt
the 2006amendntents to the UNCITRAL Model Law.s
The

evolution

commercial

of

arbitration

the

legal

in Latin

framework

for

international

America is set forth

in the

foregoing table, whjch is excerpted from the Compendium of Latin
American Arbitration Law.9 The Compendium tracks the enactment of
s

See, e.g., Jonathan

C. Han"lilton,

lntcmatimwl Arbitrntion as a Component of

Lnlin Anwricnn Reforms: The Case of Peru (1997) (on file with author).
IJ This table is an excerpt of lhe Cmnpendium of Lnli11 A111ericnTL Arbitmtion Lnw.
See sttpmnote 4. This is based on <Ill aualysis of diverse sources and may only be

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

Panama

the

[Vol. 30:4

U. Pn. f. lnfl L.

1104
artd

New

York

Conventions

throughout

Latin

Arncrica. The Co111pendium also notes the year in which each state
adopted and/ or an1ended its domestic arbihation law.
In addition to Lhe Panama and New York Conventions, smne
Latin American states have also ratified other regional conventions
and internalional agreernents.
have

ratified

1979

the

At a regiona I level, certain states
Inter-American

Convention

on

ExtraterritoriC�l Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbilral Awards
('Montevideo Convention"),10 while the member states of the
Mercado

ComCm

"Mercosur")

del

adopted

Sur
the

(Southern
Las

1992

Common

l'VlaTket

Protocol.1 1

Lenas

or
The

Montevideo Convention provides at Article 1 that it acts as

a

supplement lo the Panama Convention in that it applies "to
arbitral

awards

Convention]."

in al!
The

matters

not

covered

by

the

[Panama

Las Leiias Protocol, meanwhile,

does not

n1ention the Panmna or New York Conventions.
A distinguishing characteristic of arbitration
enforcement

treaty

enforcement

of

framework- something

court

judgments

across

bas been the

lacking
borders.

as

to

the

Recently,

however, a Latin An1erican state (Mexico) was the first to ratify the
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements ("Choice of
Court Convention"). Mexico ratified the Convention in September

2007,

and it was signed by the United States in January

the European Community in April 2009.12

2009 and by

The Choice of Court

Convention aims to reassure contracting parties that when they
agree upon an exclusive court to hear potential business djsputes
arising between

them,

the

judgments that

result

from

such

agreements wi11 be recognized and enforced intern.abonally.

reproduced or h·anslated with credit This Essay focuses on Latin American
commercial arbitration. For a survey of Latin American investment arbitration,
see Jonathan C. Hamilton, A Decade of Latin AmericnJZ Jnvestme11L Arbitmtion, LATIN
AMERICAN INVESTMENT TREI\TY ARBITRATION: THE CONTROVERSIES AND CONFLICTS 69
(Mary H. Mourra & Thomas E. Carbonneau eds., 2008) (discussing investment
arbitration in Latin America).
10 OAS, Inter-An1erican Convention on Extraletritorial Validity of Foreign
Judgments and Arbitral Awards, May 14, J979, 1439 U.N.T.S. 87.
1r Mercado Comun del Sur, Protocol on Jurisdictional Cooperation and
Assist<'lnce in Civil, Commercial, Labor and Administrative Matters, June 27, 1992.
l2 Hague Convention on Choice of the Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44
LL.M.
1294,
nvnilnble
nt
http:/ jwww.hcch.nel/index_en.php?act
=conventions.stattJs&cid=98#legend.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/19
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Previously,

there

was

no overarchjng international

1105
treaty

framework for recognition of court judgments that accomplishes
this.

Jnstead, states have traditionally enforced each other's

judgments based on international comity and reciproci ty.
result,

the

enforceability

of judgn1enl'S

has

been varied

As a
and

uncertain, leading many parties to choose to arbitrate i nternational
disputes rather than to take their chances with domestic courts.
The Choice of Court Convention seeks to provide certainty a s to
the enforcement of l i tigation judgments by requiring contracting
states to recognize and enforce judgn1ents given by chosen courts,
absent certain exceptions and to the extent that the award does not
compensate the injured party for more than actual dmna ges.n The
adoption of the Choice of Court Convention by additional Latin
American sta tes may affect dispute reso l u tion in the region.
4.

THE EFFfCACY OF THE PANAMA CONVENTION

The Panama Convention shares many key provisions a n d the
principal

objective of protecting and

arbitration with
d i fferences

promoting

the New York Convention.

between

the

two

conventions.

interna tional

There are key
Some

of

these

differences relate to the scope of application and procedu r a l rules
of the two conventions. Others relate to the obligation of courts to
compel arbitration, and the requirements parties must follow to
obtain

the

recognition

and

enforcement

of

arbitral

awards.

Another difference is the default rule established by Article 3 of the
Panama Convention which provides that 11[1]n the absence of a n
express agreen1ent between the parties, the arbitration s h a l l b e
conduct�d in accordance with the RuJes of Procedure of the Inter
American Cmmnercial Arbitration Commission (''IACAC11).14 This
feature of the Panama Convention is d iscussed further below. 1s
Additionally, a number of issues addressed i n t h e New York
Convention are absent from the Panama Convention.

Unlike the

New York Convention at Article t the Panama Convention does
not specify the scope of its application- either with respect to the
subject matter of the arbitration or the nationality of the parties.

J1.
�� See Panama Convention, supm note 1, art. 3.
,., See i11jm Section 5.
t:>

Sec id. arts. 9,
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The Pc:mama Convention also lacks the reciprocity provision set o u t
a t Article l(3) o f the New York ConventLon enabling states to
require that arbitral awards be made in the territory of another
contracting slate.1<>

In addition, the Panama Convention leaves

open to broad construction the concept of when 21rbitration ·is
considered ' ' international."

1t also does not require the courts o f

n1em.ber states to refer parties t o arbitration after f i n d i n g that the
parties have c;igned a valid arbitration agreernenL

Finally1 the

Panama Convention does not contain formal requirements for
obtaining the recognition and en forcement of

a

foreign arbitral

award similar to those set out at Article IV of the New York
Convention -such as the filing of the original

or

a duly certified

copy of the original award and original mbitration agreen1cnl, as
weJJ as a certified translation if necessary.
The relationship between the Panama Corwention and the New
York Convention has been a SOLLrce o f son1e friction as reflected in
the comments of commentators such as Professor Albert Jan van
den

Berg,

author

of

the

seminal

work

on

the

Nevv

York

Convention.17 Two decades ago, he observed in a 1989 article that
" [ t] he tradjtional hostility towards .. . international arbitration in
Latin America appears to be on the wane,'' and queried whether
After
the conventions are compatible and "can co-exist. "1o
analyzing the differences between the two conventions, Professor
van

den Berg

compatibility

ultimately

question

concluded

was

"a

that

reserved

the

answer

yes.''19

He

to the
further

submitted that "[i]n cases of concurrent applicability, n o major
conflict between both Conventions would seern to arise, except
with respect to the applicability of the IACAC Rules.

Sucb

conflicts may be resolved by the rule of conflicts of treaties of
maximum efficacy. "20

16

See New York Convention, supra note 2, a.rt. 1(3).

17

ALBERT jAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1958: TOWARDS A
UNJFORM}UDlCIAL 1NTERPRETATION (1981).
18 See Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Cmwention 1958 and Pmwmn
Conve11tion 1975: RedtmdaHcy or Compatibility?, 5 ARB. INT'L 214, 214-15 (1989)

(describing how full compatibility "raises the question what may be the raison
d'el're of the Panama Convention in view of the New York Convention").
IY

Jd. at 229.

20

/d.
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Observing how the Conventions have been interpreted and
applied by arbitral h·ibunals and local courts, Professor van den
Berg remarked on the New York Convention in 1999: ''(i]£ it ain't
broke, don't fix it."21 Following a further decade o£ precedents,
Professor van den Berg remarked in 2008 that the New York
Convention "is i11 need of nwdernization" and tl1at many of its
provisions need to be 'added', existing provisions are 'unclear',
'outdated', and need to be 'revised.'"22 He has thus proposed a
"Hypothetical Draft'' of an an1ended New York Convention (the
"Draft Convention") designed to clarify, simplify an.d 1nodernize
that convention.:n
The Draft Convention is of particular interest in light of the
distinctions between the Pane�m.a and New York Conventions.
Among its principal aspects, the Draft Convention seeks to clarify
the scope of application of the New York Convention set forth in
Article I. As noted above, the Panama Convention Jacks such a
characteristic.
The Draft Convention proposes to abolish the reciprocity
requirement found in Article 1(3) of the New York Convention, and
si1nplifies the formal requirements for the recognition and
enforcement o£ arbitral awards contained in Article lV. These are
provisions which the Panama Convention did not have in the first
instan.ce. Under Article 2(2)(b) of the Draft Convention, courts can
refuse to compel arbitration if they determine there is prima facie
no valid arbitration agreement under the law of the country where
the award will be made. Additionally, Article 3(4) of the Draft
Convention requires that courts act "expeditiously'' on a request
for enforcement of an arbitral award.

21 Sec Albett Jan van den Berg, Striving for Uniform littel'pl'etation,
ENFORCING ARBITRATION AWARDS UNDER THF. NF.W YORK CONVENTION 41,

m

42

(United Nations ed., 1999).
22 See Albert Jan van den Berg, The Draft Dublin Convention 2008-An
Explanalion of the Proposed Changes prepared at the Plenary Session of the
1nternational Council for Commercial Arbitration ("ICCA") Conference, 'n1e New
York Ccmvention, at 50 (June 10, 2008), available at http:/jwww.arbitration-icea.org
/media/0/12133703697430/ explanatory_note_ajb_rev06. pdf.
23
See Albert Jan van den Berg, Hypothetical Draft Convention on the
International Eniorcement of Arbitration Agreements and Awards: Text of the
Convention (Ma y 29, 2008), rrvailnble at http://www.arbitration-icca.org
/media/0/12133A740979RO/hypothetical_draft_convP.ntion_ajbrev06.pd£
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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the

current

grounds

for

refusing

recognition and enforcement found in Article V of the N e w York
Convention, the Draft Convention applies them only in "ntanifest
cases" where the issue was also timely raised in the underlying

arbitration.

Moreover, the Draft Convention changes the public

p o l icy exception
Convention

found

(also

in

present

Article
in

V(2)(b)

Article

of

the
of

5(2)(b)

New
the

York

Panama

Convention) to require a vjolation of "international public policy as
prevailing in the country where enJorcen1ent is sought." 24
Finally, the Draft Convention clarifies COLlrts' discretion under
New York Convention Article Vl to adjourn enforcement actions
pending separate mu1ulment proceedings, as well as the parties'
ability

to

seek

enforcement

of

arbitral

awards

under

other

agreements or law as provided by New York Convention Article
VIPS

A lthough the Panama

Convention

contains

a

similar

adjoununent provision a t Article 6, it does not refer to recognition
and enforcement under other agreements.
A l though directed specificaUy at perceived defects i n the N e w
York

Convention,

the

Draft

Convention

carries

implications for the Panama Convention as w el l .

important
The Draft

Convention would in some ways narrow the gap between the two
conventions by abolishing or simplifying provisions o f the New
York Convention that are not found jn the Panama Convention,
such as the Article 1(3) reciprocity provision and the formal
requirements of Article lV.
At the same tline, because it also addresses issues contained in
both agree1nents, the DTafl Convention could widen certain gaps
between the two instruments, compounding issues o f con1patibility
and

co-existence.

Moreover,

such

considerations

about

the

Panama Convention arise in a context of omens of the return of the
Calvo

Doctrine,
arbitration.26

24

particularly

with

respect

to

investment

ld.

T n particular, Article 7 of the Draft Convention provides that u[i]£ an
arbitratjon agreement or arbitral award can be enforced on a legal basis other than
this Convention in the country whe.re the agreement or award is invoked, a party
seeking enforcentent is allowed to rely on such basis." hi. ar t, 7.
1o With respect to the Panama Convention, see, e.g. , Oaus von Wobeser, The
lnfluence of the New York Convention in Latin A merica and on the lnte.r
American Convention o n International Commercii:1l Arbitration, 2 Drsr. RES. INT'L.
25
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ARBITRAL CONYEN flONS Ai\ID ARBITRAL PRACTICE

fundan1ental

issue,

m

theory,

is

which

oJ

the

conventions a p plies in a given enforcement proceed ing.

rwo
With

respect to the i n terrelation between the Panan1a and New York
Conventions, Ar ticle

VII

ew York Convention provides

of the

Lhat:
Th� prov tswns of the present Convention shall not affect
the

vn l i d i ty

of

multilateral

or

concc>rr1 ing the recognition a n d

bilateral

agreements

enfon:ernent uf srbitTal

awards entered into by the Contracting States nor deprive
any i n terested party of any right he may have to avail

himself of a n arbitral award i n the mzmncr and to the extent
allowed by the law or the treaties of the country where such
award is sought to be relied u pon.J.7
The

Pamm1a

Convention

compatibility provision.

does

not

contain

any

such

For some1 this discrepancy suggests that

the Pancuna Convention should apply i n cases of conflict between
the two conventionsr especially since the Panama Convention is the
more focused regional instrument, and was also created after the
New York Convention.2B

In other contexts, the agreement that is

most favorable to the recognition and en£orcement of the arbitral
award is preferred .29

43, 5�-55

(2008). With respect to the recent state of tJ1e Calvo Doctrine, see, e.g.,
Bernardo M. Cremades, The Resurgence of the Calvo Doctrine in Latin Amerka,
7 Business Law lnternational 53 (2006); Horacio Crigera Na6n, Arbitration and
Latin America: Progress and Setbacks, in Arbitration INSIGHTS; TWENTY YEARS OF
THE ANNUAL LECTURE OF THE SCifOOL OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 393 (Julian
D.M. Lew & Loukas A. Mistelis eds., 2007). See also Council of Americas Trade
Advisory Group, Building /he Hemispheric Growth 1\gcnda: A New Framework for
Policy, Council of Americas, at 6 (20 09) (noting reduced "political desire" for
additional trnde and investment treaties).
��
New York Convention, supra note 2, art. Vll.
2::! See, e.g., ]A03 KLEINHEISTTIRKAMP, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARI3fTRATION
IN LATIN AMERICA 27 (2005) ("There are good reasons in favor of the simple

solution of the general rule of conflict of treaties lex specialis derogate gemrnli.").
Specifically, because the New York Convention allows other agreements and
addresses local problems, Kleinheisterkamp reasons "[i]f the arbitration is a
genuine Inter-American one, the Panama Convention will prevail as lex specialis
over the [New York] Convention." !d.
19 See, e.g., infi·a Section 5.2. (discussing Peru's 2008 arbitration Jaw which
follows this approach).
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In most cases, the Panama cu1d New York Conven ti on s n1ay
provide for the same results i n theory. Nonetheless, the cases
outli ned below demonstrate how the coex istence of two
conventions arises in p ract ice of the recognition and enforcement
of foreign Mbitral awards. This issue is best cxarnined by a
co mpa rati ve Jaw survey, on a country-by-country basts.
The
survey below is a samp l e of certain laws and precedents.
5. 1 . Llnited States

In tl1e United States, the question of vvhich convention governs the
recognition and enforcement of a r bi t ra l a·wards is set forth in
Section 305 of the Federal Arbi trc:� tion Act (the "FAA" ).3° Pu rs uan t
to Section 305:
When the requiren1ents foT a pp l i cat i on of both the [Panama
Convention] and the [New York Convention] are metr
determ.ination as to which Convention appl ies shalt u n l ess
otherwise expressly agreed, be made as follows: (1) If a
maj ority of the parties to the arbitration agreen1ent are
citizens of a State or States that have ratified or acceded to
the [Panama Co nv ention ] and are rTternber States of the
Organization of American States, the [Panama Conven ti on ]
shall apply.
(2) In all other cases the fNew York
Convcntionj shall apply.31
Section 305 represents an attempt

by the Judiciary Conuni ttee of
the U.S. House of Representatives to provide a un i fo rm procedure
for the application of the Panama and New York C on ven t i ons by
establ ish in g a clear h iera rchy. Courts in the United States have
recogn ized the obli ga ti on s in1 posed on them by Section 305 in
resp ecti n g this h ier a rchy .32
30 See,
e.g.J ]OHN P. BOWMAN, THE PANAMA CONVENTlON AND ITS
lMPLEMENTATION UNDER 11-!E FEDERAL ARBITRATION Aa 81 n.239 (2002).
31 Federal Arbitration Act, 9. U.S.C. § 305 (2000).
32 See, e.g"/ Banco d e Seguros del Estado v. Mutual Marine Offices, Inc., 230 F.
Supp. 2d 362, 367, n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), nffd 344 F.3d 255 (2d Ci.r. 2003) ("Where the
requirements of both the lnter-American Convention and New York Convention
are met, the Inter-American Convention governs if 'a majority of the parties to the
arbitration agreement are citizens of a State or States that have ratified or acceded
to the [nter-American Convention and are member States of the Organization of
American States."'); Progressive Casualty Ins. v. C.A. Re<�seguradora Nacional de
Venezuela, 802 F. SLt pp. 1069, 1074 (S.D.N.Y. 1 992), reu'd nn ather grounds, 991 F.2d
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Such a hierarchy is notably absent frorn the arbitration statutes
of rnany Lstin American

countries.

ln

con l ras t local courts

throughout Latin America tend to deterrnine which convention
appl ies. Indeed, even where the p a rt ies have themselves specified
which convention should apply, one cornmentalor suggests that " it
is . � . not certain whether Latin
p a rt i es

'

American judges

will accept t he

explicit choice of preference for one Convention or the

other- a choice which is permitted by the implementing U.S.
l c gi s 1 a tion."33

5.2. Peru
Anicle 74(1) of Peru 's 2008 arbitration law provides that
gn
fo r ei u

arbitral a w a r d s s h al l

be reco v
gnized

and enforced

in

accordance with: (a) the New York Convention; (b) the Panama
Convention;

or

(c) any other recognition and eniorcement treaties

to which Peru is a party.

With respect to potential d iscrepancies

among these instruments,

A r t i cl e 74(?)

of the new law iollows

Article 128 of the 1996 law by attempting to enforce foreign arbitral
awards to the maximun1 extent possib]e, providing that "except
where the parties have agreed otherwise, the applicable treaty shall
be that most favorable to the party who

seeks

the recogni t i on and

enforcernent of the foreign award.":�4
Under Articles 76 and 77 of the new law, the recognition
and enforcem_ent of foreign arbitral awards in PenL is designed as a
two-step process where courts firsl reco gni ze an award i n whole or
i n part and then order its enforcement. Moreover, as with Article
1 29 of the 1996 law, Article 75 of the new law closely follows the
grounds for non-recognition contained in Article 36(1) of the
UNCITRAL Model Law and Article 5 of the Panama and New
York Conventions.
Once agajn reflecting a pro-enforcement stance, Article 75
of

the

new

law

applies:

(1)

when

there

is

no

applicable

42 (2d Cir. 1993)) ("The Ne\·\1 York Convention and the Inter-American

Convention both represent current legal and political thinking favoring
arbitration as a means of alternative dispute resolution. fn § 305 Congress
sensibly provided for choosing between the two conventions if both applied to a
given contract").
:n KLElNHEISTERKA1vlP, supra note 28, at 28.
34 All quotations from Latin American arbitration laws contained m this
artirlP art=> (rP.e translations from the Spanish originaL
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in ternational treaty; or (2) when there is an applicable international
treaty but the Jaw itself is more favorable to the party seeking
recognition of the foreign arbitral awarc-L taking into account the
prescription periods provided under Peru vian law. Sirnilarly and recognizing tha t Article V l l (1) of the New York Convention
p ro v ides that it s.hall not affect the validity of other tTtul tilateral or
bilateral agreernents entered into by contracting sta tes - Article 78
of Peru's new arbitration la \1\' goes c1 stt.:p further than the 1996 law
in specifically allowing parties to avail themselves of the legal
rights mos t supportive of their arbitrt:� tion a gree men t s and arbitral
11wards.
5.3. Chile

Although Chile was one of the first Latin American
countries to ratify the New York Convention ( i n 1975), the
country's legal regime for arbitration lagged for years behind those
of other countries i n the region.35 In 2004, however, Chile enacted
a new arbitration law (Law No. 19,971) which is substantially
based on the UNCITRAL Model Law.Jo Chilean courts have held
that the new law governs arbilTal procedure with respect to
contracts executed prior to its enactmentY
01ile' s arbitration law does not expressly regulate the
relationship between the statute and the Panama and New York
Conventions, nor does it specify a preference for either convention.
As a result, Chilean courts themselves deteTmine which instrument
prevails in the case of a discrepancy. Nonetheless, Chilean courts
have demonstrated their overall respect for the arbitral process by,

Carlos Eugenio Jorquiera & Karin Helmlinger, Chile, ill
184 (Nigel Blackaby, David
Lindsey & Alessandro Spinillo eds., 2002) ("fl]n order for Chile to develop as a
possible centre for international arbih·ation i t is critical for it to update its
nineteenth centwy arbitration legislation . . . . ) .
3b See, e.g., KLEINHEISTERKAMP, supra note 28, at 8i Jonathan C. Hamilton et al.,
35

See, e.g.,

]NTERNAT!ONAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMElUCA 89,

"

Clrilc; Cliifenn Appellate Court Rules Oil Applicability uf lnlemnlional Arbitration Law,
lNT'L DISP.
li

Q. 19 (2007).

Jonathan C. Hamilton et al., Commercial Abritration in Latin America, 1 TNT'L

Drsr. Q. 13, 19 (2007) (citing D' Arcy Ma:;ius Benton & Bowles inc. Ltda. v. Otero

Lathrop Miguel, Recurso de f [echo, Rol No. 865-2000 (Corte de Apelaciones de
Santiago, Primera Sala, May 26, 2006) (holding that Chile's 2004 arbitration law
applies to d isputes arising fron1 contracts executed prior to its enactment).
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among other things, confirming that the role o f domestic courts i.J1
international arbitration proceedings is l i mited.3S
In 2008, for instance, the C hilean Supreme Court rejected
arguments raised in opposition to the recognition and enforcement
of

arbitral

an

award

rendeJed.

in

Brazil,

finding

that

the

Respondent's arguments exceeded the scope o f its review.39 To the
contrary, " [t l he Supreme Court staled thelt the sole purpose of the
eniorcement proceeding was to verify the compliance of certain
minimum req uirements related to the respect of public policy, the
vahd

notifjcation. to

the

party against

[whom]

the award

is

invoked, the respect to the limits of j u risdiction and the definite
character of the. decisions to be e n forced." -l!J
5.4. Mexico

'Mexico's arbitration law, contained in Title IV, Book V of the
country's Commercial Code, was enacted in 1 993 and largely
tt'acks the UNC:fTRAL Model Law.

Article 141.'1 of l· h e statute

provides that the arbitration law governs ''except as provided in
i.nternational treatieS.11

In this regard, the Panama and New York

Conventions constitute " t h e Supreme Law of the State'' Ltnder
Article 133 of the Mexican Constitution a n d - a s such - arc above
Federal legislation in Mexico.-n
As in

Chile,

Mexico's arbitration

law

is silent as

to the

relationship between the statute and the Panama and New York
Conventions, and also does not specify

a

preference for either

convention. At the same tin1e, given that Mexico's arbitration law
incorporates the main provisions of both agreements through its

3S

See, e.g., D'Arcy, Rol No. 865-2000 (Chile).

See Cristian Conejero Roos, Tile Netu York Conve11tio11 in Lati11 America�
Lessons from Recent Court Decisio11s, GLOBAL ARBITRA rLOJ\i REv. (2009), available at
J<l

http:j/ www .globalaJ·bitrationreview.com/ handbooks/13/ sections/ 50/ chapters
/499 (citing Gold . utrition Industria e Comercio v. laboratoria Garden House SA
(Sept. 15, 2008)).
40
ell

Jd.
See Oaus von Wobeser, Mexico, in

AMERICA, supra

}j\JTERNATIONAL ARBJTRATION IN LATIN

note 35, at 155, 184 (recognizing that international treaties ratified
by Mexico, including the Panama and New York Conventions, " are situated
above Federal legislation in the country's legal hierarchy, and they bind both
authorities and individuals") "These treaties are self-executing vvithoul fmther
need for implementing legislation." ld.
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a dherence t o t h e UN CITRAL l\!Io d el Law, Ivlexican cour ts rarelv
.I

d irectly apply the c onventions themselves.
Mexican courts have on occasion based their d e c i s i ons to
enforce foreign arbitral a-vv ards on the conv entions .

Nordso l l Co rp o ra tion

v.

I n the case o f

Iu d u s t rias Cnmer SA d e C V, f o r ins tance, a

U . S. par tyr sou ght reco gnition and enforcement in l\l[exico of an
arbitral

a\Vclrd

rendered

under

AAA

rules . 4 2

A lthough

enforce men t was gra nte d i n the first ins tance, the Mexican party
filed an a m p a ro .

A ffirming the decision of the lower co urt, the

Mexican Sixth Civil Court o f the F irs t C i rcuit based i ts decision on
both the Pa n a ma and New York Conventio n s .

I n reaching i ts

decisi on, the Court " he l d that the grounds u n der the New Y or k
Con v ention were very restrictive and j u d ges w e r e n o t a l l o w e d to
review the meri ts o f the d ecision contained i n the a rb i tral a w ar d . "

5 . 5 . B rnz i l
I n contrast to the foregoing examples, the d evelo pment of
Brazilian law reflects the country's long-stand ing reticence tow a r d s
international co mmercial arbitration .

Brazil rati fi e d the Panama

Convention in 1995, but did not enact a d omestic arbitration law
favorable

to

in ternational

following year .43

commercial

arbitration

until

the

Brazil's arbi tration law does n o t m ention the

Panama Convention, and is modeled on the Sp anish arbitra tion
law of 1988 and the UN CITRAL Model Law .44 A l th o u gh Brazil d i d
not ratify t h e New Y o r k Convention until 2002, Articles 3 7, 3 8 a n d
3 9 of its 1 996 arbitration law closely mirror Articles IV(1) and V o f
the New York Conven tion with respect to t h e recognition a n d
enforcement

of foreign

arbitral

awards.45

Still,

Brazil's

1996

n

See Conejero Roos, suprn note 39 .

.J3

See KLEINHEISTERKAMP, s upra note 28, at 8 ("Brazil's former arbitral regime,

which had been contained in the Civil Code of 1 91 6 and then in part repeated and
complemented by the Code of Civil Procedure of 1973 - especially as interpreted
and applied by Brazilian scholars and courts - was one of the most notorious
exan1ples of Latin American adversity against arbitration.

Since the early 80s,

there had been several incentives for modernizing this regime and it was only
after fierce lobbying that the new law could be passed in 1996").
H Id.
!S
1 11

Sec Fabiano Robalinho Cavalcanti, E njo rce111 e n t of Fo reign A rbitral Awa rds
GLOBAL
ARBITRATION
REV.
(2009),
available
at

B razil,

l1tt p : / / globalarb i trationreview.comj handbooks/ 1 3 / sections/ 51 / chapters/ 502/ b
razil (" The l e gisl ature used the text of the New York Convention as the basis for
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arbitration l a w rernaincd subject to constitutional challenge u n l i l

2001.�"
Since the adoption of the New York Convention in 2002, Brazil
has increasingly lT8nsforn1ed i tself into a jurisdiction favorable to
intern8 tiona 1 arbitration.

Between

and

1996

act ions for the

2004,

recognition cmd enforcement of foreign arbitral avvards in Brazil
were heard by the Supremo Tribunal Federal ("STf"), w h i l e since

2004 such cases have been heard by the Superior Tribunal de
J usti�a ("ST]" )."' During this tirne, the STF denied recogrti l'ion and
enforcement in two o u t of five cases, vvhile the

sro

has denied

recognition and enforcement i n only four out o f seventePJI cases.-�ll
In

both

Tribunals,

recognition

and

enforcement

primarily on p.rocedura1 grounds, including:

were

dcni�d

where the Brazilian

party was improperly summoned (two cases), where there wc1s no
vahd written arbjtration agreement (tlu-ee cases), and ·where the
arbitral award had been assigned to a third party which lacked
standing to seek recognition a n d enforcement (one case)_.FJ

drafting [ A rticles 38 and 39 of the Brazilian arbitration law] which, in the end,
basically provide that the homologa t io n of fOl'eign arbitral «1wnrds rnav be denied
in Brazil in the same circumstances as the ones provided in article V of the New
York Convention."); Jonatha n C Ha rn il ton, et al., Brnzil: £11jorcenu.:nf 11- Arbitrnl
Awards, lNT'L D!SP. Q.,
tWailable at http:/ /www.whitecase.com/idq/Fall2007/cal/ (last visited Apr. 09, 2009).
4& See M.B.V. Comm. v. Re s il fndt:tstria e Comercio Ltda., S.T.F., A p . No. 21496, Relator: Ministrc Presidente, 05.08.1997, 102 S.T.F.J. 958 (Brazil) ( upholding
cons t itu tionali ty o£ Brazil's 1 996 arbitration law). Seen/50 Crist ian Conejero Roos
& Renato S. G ri o n, Arbitratio11 in Brazil: Lnw 1111d Practice frum tm lCC Perspective, 17
ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL. 11, 13 (2006) ("Pm five years, the constitutionahty issue
left dou bts hanging over the future of the framework. which the 1996 Law sought
to es tablish. However, in 2001, the Supreme Court ren dered a majorily decisio n
lMB V], in which the Lavv was held to be con st itu tion al. ) ; Jonathan C. Hi.lrnilton,
Brazilian Supreme Coul't Upltolds 1 996 Arl1itm tion Law, 15 lNT'L DrsP. RESOL. 5. 5-6
(2002).
-t7 See, e.g., Klu wer Law International, J'[A Monthly Report (Eoger Alford ed.,
Apr.
2005),
m.:iailable
nt
http:/ jwww.klt •wer;trbitrMion.romj::�rbitration
/Newsletter.aspx?month=aprilmay2005
(recognizing
that
Constilu tiona I
Amendrnent No. 45/2004, which entered into force on December 31, 2004, had the
effect of tran sferring j wisdict io:n over the recogni tion and enforcement of fo reign
arbitral awards from the STF to the STJ); Conejero Roos & Grion, supra n o te 46, at
14.
·!8 Fernando E d u a rd o Serec & Antonio M. Barbuto Nctor Tfw New York
"

Com>eJLtioll

n11d

the Enjorceme11t of Foreign

ArbitTnl Awards, li'il''L L. OFFICE,

Dec. 4, 2008, http : / f \·vww internationallawoffice comj Newsletters/ detai l .a spx ?g
""2d2e3066-1 253-4966-b965-67a5b2bd3le7&rt>dir=1.
.

+9

Trl
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In a d d i tion, the STJ h a s demons tra ted at l e a s t s o n1e will ingness
to

grant recognition and

proce dural irregula r i ties.

enforcement even where

there

For insta nce, in L 'A iglon 5/A

v.

exist

Textil

Uniao 5/A , so the STJ granted the reco gni tion and e nforcement of a
foreign arbitr a l award even where the Brazilian p a rty a r g u e d that
the p arties' arbitration a greement was not properly s i gned in
a ccordance with Article 4 (1) of Brazil' s a rbitra tion law a n d Article
II of the New York Convention.s1

In thi s c a se, the STJ found t h a t

t h e Brazilia n p a rty h a d been a w a re of t h e defect a n d d i d n o t r a ise i t
i n the underlying a rbitra tion, a nd that therefore s u c h a rgument
had been w a ived .S2

Fina l J y, not unl ike Mexico, it has been noted

that:
There a r e a lrea dy some precedents in w hich p a rties h av e
filed

oppositions

to

homologa tion

requ e s ts

r a 1smg

arguments rel a te d to the merits o f the foreign arbitra l
award and the Supreme Tribunal o f Justice h a s strongly
rejected these opposi tions, e mpha s izing tha t the merits of a
foreign award is not subject to review in homologation
procedures. 53
5 . 6 . A rg enti n a

Although Argentina is one of the more active juris dictions for
commercial arbitration in L a tin Americ a , its domes tic arbitration
regime has changed little since the nineteenth century .54

so

Indeed,

L'Aiglon S.A. v. Textil Uniao S.A., S.T.F., Ap. No. 0031430-2, Relator:

Sentenca Estrangeira Contestada, 18.05. 2005, 30 Y.B. Com. Arb. 426 (Brazil).
See, e.g., Emilia Onyema, Formalities of the Enforcement Procedure (Articles III
I V, in ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL

51

and

AEBITRAL AWARDS: THE NEW YORK CONVENTION IN PRACTICE 597, 607 (Emmanuel

Gaillard & Domenico di Pietro eds., 2008) (describing how the outcome of the
arbitration turned on this factor).
52

Id.

53

Fabiano Robalinho Cavalcanti, E nforcement of Foreign A rbitral Awards in

Brazil, ARB . REV. AMs. 2009, h ttp:/ / globalarbitrationreview.com/ handbooks / 3 1
/ sections/ 5 1 / chapters/ 502.
54

See,

e.g . ,

Alessandro

Spinillo

&

Emilio

Vogelius,

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note

35,

Argentina,

in

at 22, 22-23

(discussing " the urgent need to reform the national law on arbitration [in
Argentina] which still dates from the nineteenth century" and proposing that
adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law " would certainly enhance the legal
security and predictability of the arbitral procedure, and help to create a new
climate in which multinational corporations carrying out business in the region
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various atten1pts to adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law in Argentina
have so far been unsuccessfuJ.s;; Moreover, given that the country's

arbitr8tion laws predate the ratification of the Panama and New
York Conventions, A rge n ti na docs not have a s ta t u t e that
specifical l y regulates the proced u res to be followed in cases
involving the recogni t ion and e n f o rcemen t of foreign arbitral
awards.
In A rgen t i na, foreign arbitral awards m:e enforced under
internatlonal treaties- such as the Panama and New York
Convenbons- if applicable.56
A l th ough Argentine courts are
bound by these agreements, there is no procedure for reso l vi ng
discrepancies between the two agreements if the parties
themselves have not chosen a convention. In other cases, foreign
'arbitTal awards are enforced under Argentina's National Code of
Civil and C01nmercial Procedure.57
fn all cases, however,
enforcement must be sought in the domestic court which would
have resolved the dispute had it not been submitted to arbitration.
6.

PROMOTING AND PROTECrtNG

AGREEMENTS TO ARB1TRATE

As noted above, one unique feature o f the Panama
Convention vis-a-vis the New York Convention is the d efa u l t rule
established by Article 3. It provides that '' [i]n the absence of an
express agreement between the parties, the arbitration shall be
conducted in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Inter
American Commercial Arbitration Comrnission.11ss On this basis,
au thors note that where there is an agreement to arbitrate but the
a bsen ce of express agreement as to procedural m atters, the
app lication of the IACAC Rules has bee.n considered mandatory.s9
may become willing to accept
arbitration in Argentina.").

international

arbitration clauses providing fm

55 See KLEINJJEISTERKAMP, supra note 28, nt 6 (attributing the failure of the four
attempts since 1990 to introduce the UNCITRAL-Model Law to the lack of interest
in the House of Representatives).
56 See Spinillo & Vogelius, supm note 54, at 55-57 (providing an ovexview of
the enforcement of foreign arbilral awards in Argentina).
57

Id.

Panama Convention, suprn note 1, art. 3.
59 See, e.g., Bow:-.·tAN, s11prn note 30, at 30-31; KLEINHEISTERKI\MP, suprn note 28,
a t 28; B lackaby et al., Overview of Regional DevelopHH�Ilts, in lNTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA, supm note 35, a t 1 , 6 (recognizing that " [ the
11\CAC rulesj benefit from a privileged status under the Pcmama Convention
:>s
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Courts have recognized a n obli gation to apply the IACAC
Rules .6°

I n A n derra E n e rgy Co rp . v . SA PE T Dev. Corp . , the D i s trict

Co urt for the Northern District of Texas gra nted the d efend a n ts'
rnotion to compel arbitra tion p u rs u a n t to the IACAC Rules .

The

Court arrived at this result by applyin g Sec tion 303 (b) of the FAA,
which provi des that " [i ] n the event the agreement does not make
provision for the

place

of arbi tration

or the

a p p o inhnen t of

arbitrators, the court shall direct that the arbitration shall b e held i n
accordance with Article 3 o f the [Pa nama Conven t i o n] . " 61
Ar ticle 3

of the

Panama

Convention

pro v i d e s

for

I n turn,

arbitr a ti o n

ou rsuant t o the IACA C Rules.
L

Thus, as noted by one comn1enta tor, the d efa u l t r u l e c o n tained
in Article 3 of the Panama Convention and of the IA CAC Rules i s
relevant

to

arbitra tion

p rac t i tioners

a d v ising

on

arbitration

a greements b etween American parties:
The incorporation by law, i n the absence o f a n express
a greement between the parties, o f the IACAC Rules into an
arbitration a greement subj ect to the Panama C o nvention
ma kes
counsel

it

impera t i ve
are

familiar

that
with

the

parties'

these

negotiators

rules

. . . .

[B]y

and
not

incorporating the rules of s ome other arbitral institution o r
n o t expressly negating t h e application of t h e I A C A C Rules,
the parties are effectively choosing, w hether they realize i t
or n ot, the IACAC Rules to govern res olut i o n o f f u ture
d isputes . 62

since it requires their automatic application to any arbitration agreement falling
within the ambit of the Convention unless the parties agree otherwise" ).
60 S ee, e.g., Anderra Energy Corp. v. SAPET Dev. Corp., 2 2 Y.B. Com. Arb.
1 077, 1 085 (N.D. Tex. 1 997) .
61

S ee Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 303 (b) (2006).

62

BOWMAN, su p ra note 30, at 30-31 (internal citations omitted).
See also
KLEINHEISTERKAlv!P, s u p ra note 28, at 28 (stating that " [a]n important and very
peculiar feature of the Panama-Convention which has been labeled [by Peter
Schlosser and Philippe Fouchard] as ' the most inventive and daring innovation/
is Art. 3 . . . [I]nventive, since its intention is the internationalization of arbitral
proceedings to eliminate the fallback to municipal procedural law a n d , indeed,
the often dreaded na tional j udiciary . . . Daring, because it orders the application
of these norms as if they were regular law despite having been drafted by a
private entity that is not governed by the contracting States") (internal citations
omitte d ) .

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/19
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Since 2002, t h e l n ternational Centre for Dispute Hesolution
("ICDR") of the American Arbitration Associabon ("A.A._/�\'') has
had an agreement with l A C A C t o administer l A C A C arbit rations.113
TILis step was aimed at carrying out the vision o f a regional legal
framework for arbitration by providing defa u l t procedural rules
administered

by an

institution

focused

on

arbitration

for the

Americas and thus reduce the need for jtld icial intervention and
mini mize uncertainty i n Z�rbitral proceedings/'4

7. CONCLUSION
By way of sun1mary, three decades ago, Latin America lacked
a

comprehensive

legal

framework

for

the

enforcement of internotional arbitral awards.

recogni tion

and

Latin An1erican

states have since brondly adopted the Panama and New York
Conventions,

and

new

arbitration

Jaws.

Latin

A m e rican

j urisprudence '"lith respect to internotional commercial arbitration
continues to evolve.

At the satne time, two thirds of Latin

Americans still d i s trust their own judiciariesYi

This portends

continued evolution for commerc1al arbitration in Latin America in
the decades ahead.

63 See

Luis M. Mcutinez,

Are We Tltere Yet?, in ARBITRATION HEVIEW OF THE

AMERICAS (2009).
M See, e.g., Michael F. Hoellering, lllter-AIIlcricnn Conve11tion, NEW YORK LJ,
Nov. 18, 1 986, at 1, 5 ("ln the absence of designation by the parties, Article 3
provides that the arbitration rules of the IACAC shall apply. The practical effect
of this provision should be to reduce the need for judici.al intervention in
arbitration proceedings in the forum state and to minimize uncertainty and delay
of such proceedings by reason of the parties' failure to regulate important aspects
of the arbitration procedure in their agreements.")

6i f11jonnt' LntinobarOI/Ictro 2007, CORPORAC!ON LATINOBAROMETRO (2007),
http:/ jwww.latinobarometro.org/ (follow "OocLlmentos" hyperlink; then follow

"Cuestionarios" hyperlink; then foll ovv "Cu.estionario :?.007").
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